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JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS IN DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS*
By JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN**
The most serious question still unsettled in connection with
declaratory judgment cases is the right of one forum, in which
the declaratory judgment suit is brought, to enjoin the commencement of or further prosecution of actions in other courts.
The most common of these situations arises where a casualty
insurer has brought an action for declaratory judgment in a
federal forum and seeks to enjoin the institution of or further
maintenance of personal injury suits arising from the accident
in question until the insurer's liability under the casualty policy
-that is, its duty to defend such personal injury suits on behalf
of its insured and to pay judgments arising therefrom, has been
settled.
The same question may, of course, arise between forums of
different states, a declaratory judgment suit perhaps being
brought in New Hampshire and an injunction prayed to restrain
personal injury actions in New York. Or a declaratory judgment may be sought in a New York state court, and that court
asked to enjoin the maintenance of personal injury suits in one
of the federal courts. But the situation most commonly presented, and the only one with which this article will deal, arises
where a declaratory judgment is sought in a court of the United
States and injunctive relief prayed against actions contemplated,
or already pending, in state courts.
*For a general discussion of declaratory judgments, see this
author's articles Federal DeclaratoryJudgments on Automobile Insurance, Wisconsin Law Review, July, 1939, abstracted Current Legal
Thought, December, 1939, and Automobile Insurance and the Declaratory Judgment, 23 American Bar Association Journal 551.
**Author of Automobile Liability Insurance (1937), Callaghan
& Company (in publication); Automobile Insurance and the
Declaratory Judgment, American Bar Association Journal, July, 1937;
Special Phases of the Omnibus Clause, American Bar Association Journal, September, 1936; The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions,
American Bar Association Journal, January, 1936; Sleeping at the
Wheel, Iowa Law Review, March, 1937; Special .Phases of the Family
Purpose Doctrine, Tennessee Law Review, December, 1936; and other
articles. Now a member of firm of Carson, Appleman & Engert,
Urbana, Ilinois.

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS; DECLARATORY JUDGAIENTs

49

When it is remembered that the purpose of passage of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to permit one of several
contracting parties to secure an immediate adjudication of his
rights or liabilities, and to remove the hazard of acting upon his
own interpretation of his obligations,' it would seem that the
court's injunctive powers would be freely exercised toward this
goal. As Representative Gilbert, in discussion of this bill stated
in the House of Representatives, "Under the present law you
take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you
have stepped in a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law
you turn on the light and take the step."2 Under those circumstances, it would logically follow that no reasoning directed toward effectuating the true purpose of this act would deny a
liberal use of a federal court's injunctive power.
The difficulty is not so much a matter of legal philosophy
True, one court early advanced
a sound equitable reason against the over-liberal use of injunctions in such instances. The court pointed out that the injured
third party had no privity of contract with the insurer-that he
was not necessarily interested in the outcome of private battles
between insurer and insured, as to who should pay a judgment
recovered. Consequently, his right to a speedy trial of the
as it is of strict legal principle.

"Closely related to the actions in which the plaintiff, desiring to
escape ostensible obligations, seeks a declaration of the nullity of the
contract or his release from its obligations by act of the defendant or
new event, are those in which the plaintiff seeks a declaration that he
is under no duty to the defendant, as claimed. * * * A person,
uncertain of his rights under contract, brought into question by claims
against him, may take the initiative by requesting a declaration of his
duties-that is, the rights of the defendant-instead of himself waiting
to be sued. * * * The need for a dealaration arises because the
defendant asserts that the plaintiff is not privileged to act as he proposes and it is important to have the issue settled before a possible
breach occurs, or because the plaintiff, fearful of incurring forfeiture,
damages, or other penalty, desires an authoritative determination of his
privileges under his contract with the disputing defendant; or because
the plaintiff, claiming that the proposed act constitutes performance
of the contract and a discharge of his obligations under it, seeks an
authoritative confirmation of his claim, thus averting a subsequent suit'
for alleged breach and having the opportunity, should his claim of performance be denied, still to fudfiu the obligation without committing
any wrong. It is readily apparent that much loss and detriment is
saved In all these cases by construing the contract before rather than
after a purported breach." Borchard-Declaratory Judgments (1934),
Banks-Baldwin Publishing Company, pages 419, 420, 422, 424.
2Report No. 1005, Seventy-Third Congress, Second Session.
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issues in the personal injury case ought not to be abrogated by
3
a squabble over a contract in which he has no direct interest
Other courts have felt, however, that the security of the
average casualty company being unquestioned (or if questioned,
a security bond could be required under the court's equity
powers) it would be better, if legally permissable, to delay the
personal injury suits and to secure an immediate determination
of the duties of the insurer-which, if liable, must both defend
such suits and pay judgments recovered therein. While some
parties will suffer inconvenience, none will suffer loss, save in
the highly unusual situation of a policyholder becoming insolvent in the short interim required for the determination of the
policy issue.
Some decisions have bluntly stated that the federal courts
have no power to enjoin personal injury suits pending in the
state courts, relying upon the Act of March 2, 1793, Section 5,
1 Stat. 334.4 That Act, it will be recalled, reads as follows: "The
writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the
United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except
in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." Even if this conclusion were accepted, it might still be questioned as to whether
or not the real basis for non-interference by the federal forum
with that of the state is, rather, because of the inherent, independent sovereignty of each court, which cannot be affected by
alteration of statutes but only of the organic law.
It is likely that this provision was originally placed in the
laws to prevent any possibility of the federal forums encroaching upon the state courts. It may be recalled that its passage
5
was just subsequent to the decision of Chisholm v. Georgia,
3"Basing their right to have the question determined under the
New Hampshire statute and the decisions of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, the defendant's counsel entered a special appearance
in the actions at law, and claimed that the trial should be postponed

until the question of liability of the insurance company's coverage and
duty to defend the assured had been determined.
"The right of the plaintiffs in this action at law to have their
actions speedily tried and determined ought not to be held up because

.of some contract between the defendants and a third person or corpo-

ration to which they are not a party." Judge Morris, in Moulton v.
,Owler (1934) U.S.D.Ct. N.H. 5 Fed. Supp. 700 at 701.

28 United States Code, Section 379.
2 Dall. 419 (U.S. 1793).
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which startled all citizens of the young nation by calmly permitting an action against a sovereign state by a citizen of another
state in the federal court. The rather amazing immediate result
of this act, however, was that the state courts encroached in
fearful manner upon federal courts, federal officers, and federal
jurisdiction in general, while the national bodies felt helpless to
retaliate.0 State courts enjoined federal officials, arrested them,
sued them on their bonds. The situation then apparent was that
the dog bit the man freely and frequently, but that the man
was prohibited by statute from biting dog.
In 1872, the federal statute received its first real baptism in
any case. 7 From that time henceforth, the decisions involving
this act are quite inconsistent, and in many cases, ill-reasoned.
For example, in one decision, the federal court enjoined the
enforcement of a judgment obtained in a state court by fraud.
The court pointed out that the injunction was issued only against
the parties, not against the court itself. It merely took from
a party litigant certain benefits, by preventing the enforcement of a fraudulent judgment, and did not constitute a direct
8
interference with the processes of the state court.
6 See the splendid historical discussion in Warren-Federal and
State Court Interference, 43 Harvard Law Review, pages 34 et seq.
'Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 80 U.S. 679 (1872). The prior
decisions of Diggs and Keith v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch. 179, 8 U.S. 179 (1807)
and Orton v. Smith, 18 Howard (59 U.S.) 263 (1856) should be read as
early pointing the way toward enforcing the rule of non-interference.
8 "These authorities would seem to place beyond question the jurisdiction of the Circuit court to take cognizance of the present suit, which
is none the less an original, independent suit, because it relates to
judgments obtained in the court of another jurisdiction. While it
cannot require the state court itself to set aside or vacate the judgments
in question, it may, as between the parties before it, if the facts justify
such relief, adjudge that Mayer shall not enjoy the inequitable advantage obtained by his judgments. A decree to that effect would operate
directly upon him, and would not contravene that provision of the
statute prohibiting a court of the United States from granting a writ
of injunction to stay proceedings in a state court." Justice Harlan in
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 at 599 (1891).
See the pointed criticism of this result in Warren, ibid., page 372;
Taylor & Willis The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in
State Courts, 42 Yale Law Journal at 1185.
Nevertheless, a number of lower court decisions have followed this
reasoning. National Surety Company v. State Bank of Humboldt,
C.C.A. 8, 120 Fed. 593 (1903); Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Company,
158 Fed. 33T (1907); Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Callicotte, C.C.A. 8, 267 Fed. 799 (1920); Hewitt v. Hewitt, C.C.A. 9, 17 Fed.
(2) 716 (1927).
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As a matter of fact, the only injunctions which are usually
issued are directed to individuals, rather than to judges or to
other officers of the court. It is hardly likely that the framers of
this act even contemplated that the federal court would presume
to exercise direct control over independent state officials and
judges, as such. Yet state court trials can scarcely be considered
free of federal restriction if the parties litigant before it are,
by injunction, prevented from bringing a suit, proceeding to
trial, or enforcing a judgment recovered. The distinction which
the court strove to make is, it would seem, illogical.
Nor is it much better to hold that such an injunction against
enforcing a state court judgment would lie, but resting it instead
upon the basis that after a judgment is rendered the matter is no
longer before the state court-that any injunction thereafter
rendered is not, by reason thereof, in derogation of the state
court's jurisdiction. 9 From a practical standpoint, any money
judgments are enforced by the issuance of an execution. Is it
not just as much a derogation of a state court's jurisdiction to
prevent and to enjoin the use of a levy of execution as the
maintenance of the action itself ?
However, such distinctions seems to flow through this field
of the law, the federal courts having held that they cannot enjoin
a pending state court action upon the ground that a judgment
rendered therein would be void for lack of jurisdiction,' 0 but
that, even before judgment, the plaintiff therein could be
enjoined from doing anything to collect a judgment that might
be rendered in his favor."
Where the federal court has first acquired jurisdiction of the
parties and subject matter, it is quite well settled that it will use
9
"But when the litigation has ended and a final judgment has been
obtained-and when the plaintiff endeavors to use such judgment-a
new state of facts, not within the language of the statute may arise."
Simon v. Southern Railway Company, 236 U.S. 115 at 128 (1914). The
case also rests its decision, appar'ently, upon the reasoning that the
defendant had not been served with process; that accordingly the
judgment obtained was necessarily void and a nullity; that proceedings
in a state court which are a nullity are no proceedings at all, and an
injunction does not violate the statute.
For a discussion of related authorities, an examination of Taylor
& Willis, ibid, at 1186 et seq. is well worth-while.
SDetroit, M. & T.S.L.Ry. v. City of Monroe, U.S.D.Ct. E.D. Mich.
S. Div. 262 Fed. 177 at 179 (1919).
- Western Union Telegraph Company v. Tompa, C.C.A. 2, 51 Fed.
(2) 1032 at 1034 (1931).
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12
its injunctive power freely to maintain its jurisdiction.
13
Despite occasional criticism of this result, it has been followed
with fair consistency. 14 As may be expected this has led to some
sharp conflicts in the enforcement of property rights between
state and federal forums, but the federal forum has been slow to
relinquish control over any res, once it has gained jurisdiction
thereof."; As a logical outgrowth thereof, the federal courts
have enjoined new actions in state courts where the subject
matter or legal relationships have been settled by federal
There is, however, no uniformity in result as to
decree. 1
whether proceedings in the state forum will be enjoined where
7
constitutional matters are involved.'
' "The court having jurisdiction in personnam had power to require
the defendant to do or to refrain from doing anything beyond the limits
of Its territorial jurisdiction which it might have required to be done
or omitted within the limits of such territory. Having the possession
and jurisdiction of the case, that jurisdiction embraced everything in
the case, and every question arising which could be determined in it
until it reached its termination and the jurisdiction was exhausted.
While the jurisdiction lasted it was exclusive and could not be trenched
upon by any other tribunal. * * * The prohibition in the Judiciary
Act against the granting of injunctions by the courts of the United
States touching proceedings in State courts has no application here.
The prior jurisdiction of the court below took the case out of the operation of that provision." French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 'Wall.) 250 at 252
and 253. See also Dietzbach v. Huideloper, 103 U.S. 494 (1880).
" Note (1911) 5 illinois Law Review, page 508 et seq.
14 "We are of opinion, therefore, that there was concurrent jurisdiction In the two courts, and that the substantive issues in the Nevada
and California suits were so far the same that the court first seized
should proceed to the determination without interference, on the
principles now well settled as between the courts of the United States
and of the states." Justice Holmes in Rickey Land & Cattle Company
v. Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258 at 262 (1910), citing Ex parte Young.
Other decisions reiterating this principle either in direct adjudication or by way of obiter dicta are set forth in detail in 23 U.S.C.A.,
sec. 379.
-Warren, ibid., page 359 et seq. See the excellent discussion in
Taylor & Willis, ibid., pages 1177-1185, setting up the treatment of
different types of res.
ifSt. Louis Mining & Milling Company v. Montana Mining Company, 148 Fed. 450 (1906); Missouri Pacific Ry. Company v. Jones, 170
Fed. 124 (1909). By implication, Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1920) and Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S.
273 (1906), decision in which latter case is rested primarily upon
another ground. But contrast the early case of Dial v. Reynolds, 96
U.S. 340 (1877).
2' Compare the treatment in Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R. Co.,
247 U.S. 214 at 221 (1918) with Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission,
281 U.S. 470 (1929) and Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Com.
pany, 279 U.S. 159 at 211 (1928).
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In the notorious case of Ex parte Yoqng,18 the federal court
went a long step further than its past logic or even sound reason
would seem to justify. The court upheld the right to enjoin
sheriffs, prosecuting attorneys and other court officials from taking any steps or instituting any actions which the federal court
considered might derogate from its jurisdiction of a cause pending before it.19 The facts were as follows: The Mlinnesota legislature created a railroad and warehouse commission which fixed
rates for various railroad companies, materially reducing them.
The railroads filed and published schedules in accordance therewith. Subsequently an act was passed by the legislature providing special rates for certain commodities and fixing certain
penalties for violations. These rates met with opposition. The
stockholders of a certain railroad company brought suit in the
federal court to enjoin the attorney general from prosecuting
the railroad, claiming that the act was unreasonable, confiscatory,
and deprived them of property without due process of law.
Upon violation of such an injunction, the attorney general was

$100.
Now, here, after hedging as regards injunctions of indi-

fined

viduals, after debating upon distinctions between direct and
indirect interference with judicial process, the court apparently
18"The general discretion regarding the enforcement of the laws
when and as he deems appropriate is not interfered with by an injunction which restrains the state officer from taking any steps toward the
enforcement of an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of complainant. In such case no affirmative action of any nature is directed,
and the officer is simply prohibited from doing an act which he had no
legal right to do. An injunction to prevent him from doing that which
he has no legal right to do is not an interference with the discretion
of any officer.
* * * "The answer to all this is the same as made in every case
where an official claims to be acting under authority of the State. The
act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the
use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the
injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and
which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a State official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative
enactment which is void because unconstitutional." Peckham in 209
U.S. 123 at 159 Harlan dissenting.
"Warren, ibid., at 375 apparently feels that the result of comity is
inferred in such cases as Gilchrist v. Interborough Transit Company,
279 U.S. 159 at 211 (1929). This result seems to be more clearly shown
in Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36 at 57, 48 S. Ct. 268 at 275, 72 L. Ed.
457 (1928). And see In re Walker Grain Company, 294 Fed. 951 (1923);
Amusement Syndicate Company v. El Paso Land Improvement Company, 251 Fed. 345 (1918).
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threw all caution aside and enjoined the actions of the highest

ranking quasi-judicial officials. In more recent decisions, the
court seems to have saved its judicial face by invoking the doctrine of comity-by refraining from attempting to exercise
powers which, in the first instance, it is doubtful that it possesses.
It is very difficult, from such decisions at which we have
cast such a cursory glance, to formulate fixed and definite rules
to carry into declaratory judgment situations. In the face of
hedging on the one hand and the exercise of unusual and
extraordinary powers on the other, it is hard to recognize the
value of stare decisis. Perhaps the statement of Taylor & Willis
in concluding their discussion of the statutory prohibition is
as frank and accurate as can be made: "Although sweeping and
unqualified in its terms, it does not limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, but only their equity powers; it does not bind
them prior to the institution of state suits, nor after judgment
therein; if deemed necessary to make effective their own jurisdiction, it is ignored altogether. " 20 This is painfully reminiscent
of the legendary Scotchman who faithfully observed that there
were only three proper times for drinking: One was if going
out into the cold; one, when coming in from the cold; the third,
any other time.
Going to the question of declaratory judgments, it is apparent that two quite different questions are presented to the
federal court for determination when injunctions are demanded
by the plaintiff in the following situations.
1. Where the federal court acquires jurisdiction of all
parties prior to the institution of any action in the state court.
2. Where actions are already pending in the state court
and the federal forum is asked to stay the proceedings, even
though the state court clearly has prior jurisdiction of the
parties.
Now it is clear from a consideration of casualty insurance
questions that a policy breach either does not appear or may not
0Taylor & Willis, ibid., p. 1194. In this connection, see Sovereign
Camp v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292, 45 S. Ct. 49 at 51 in which it is declared,
"This section does not deprive a district court of the jurisdiction otherwise conferred by the federal statutes, but merely does to the question
of equity in the particular bill; making it the duty of the court, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, to determine whether the specific case
presented is one in which relief by injunction is prohibited by this
section or may nevertheless be granted." Comme ci, comme ca.
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occur, frequently, prior to the institution of personal injury
suits. Suppose, for example, an accident occurs upon January 1.
Suit is started by the injured person on March 1, whereupon the
policyholder notifies the company of the accident, claim, and
suit. Clearly, his delay in giving notice has breached the policy
contract. The company requests that he execute a non-waiver
agreement setting up the circumstances of delayed notice, the
company agreeing to defend the personal injury suit but, reserving its policy defense-the determination of the policy question
to await the termination of the personal injury suit. The policyholder refuses to consent to a defense under such circumstances
and refuses to sign the agreement. Now, under the doctrine of
many states, the insurer must either disclaim liability entirely
or accept the defense unequivocally. 2 1 If it does the first, it
runs the risk of a default judgment against, or a weak defense
by, the insured. It must rely solely upon its policy defense and
loses all opportunity of a defense upon the merits. If it accepts
the defense, it waives the policy breach regardless of prejudice
or other circumstances.
It was to remedy just that type of quandry and hazard of
loss that the federal Declaratory Judgment Act was passed. Yet,
if the federal court cannot enjoin prior personal injury suits,
much of the benefit disappears. in such cases of delayed notice,
of lack of co-operation, and other defenses coming late to the
attention of the insurer, if the personal injury suits are not
enjoined, the company must always suffer a loss to the extent of
the attorneys fees and costs in the defense thereof, if the insured
permits it to reserve its rights-and if the insured refuses, the
insurer must suffer the loss of either a meritorious policy defense
or the risk of a large adverse judgment if its guess, upon
disclaimer, should prove wrong.
Bearing this in mind, let us look to see what the federal
courts have done in passing upon this question.
In 1937, the situation was presented where an insurer had
made a settlement with one of several injured passengers in
nBlackwood v. Maryland Casualty Company, 24 Ala. App. 527, 137
So. 467 (1931), s. c. 25 Ala. App. 308, 150 So. 179 (1932), cert. den. 227
Ala. 343, 150 So. 180 (1933); DiFrancesco v. Zurich General Accident
& Liability Insurance Company, 105 Conn. 162, 134 A. 789 (1926);
Miller v. Union Indemnity Company, 209 App. Div. 455, 204 N.Y.S. 730
(1924); Beatty v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corporation, 106
Vt. 25, 168 A. 919 (1933).
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an automobile driven by its insured, and was negotiating with
the other passengers. Suddenly it was brought to the company's attention that these passengers had been transported by
its insured for hire, a clear violation of the policy terms. The
company immediately instituted a declaratory judgment action
to determine its liability under the policy to defend the remain-

ing causes of action or to pay judgments recovered therein, and
to recover back the payments already made upon settlements.
No personal injury suits having as yet been filed, an injunction
was prayed to restrain their institution. The lower court denied
the injunction and dismissed the suit.
Upon appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit declared: "Upon the facts alleged Mrs. Caswell would
have no defense in the damage suits. Appellant would be
obliged to defend them and it is extremely doubtful that
appellant could successfully urge its defense under the exception in the policy. Where the remedy is so doubtful there is
not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and equity
has jurisdiction. Conceding that appellant would have a
remedy in equity against Mrs. Caswell to determine the rights
and obligations of the parties to the contract, that would not
avoid the expense, annoyance, and danger of suits by the injured
person....

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the

case is remanded, with instructions to grant an interlocutory
injunction pendente lite as prayed for and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.''22
Clearly this result was justified under the holdings we
have previously examined. Other decisions are found to be
23
in accord.
2 Central Surety & Insurance Corp. v. Caswell, (1937) C.C.A. 5'
(Fla.) 91 Fed. (2) 607 at 609.
2 "At the argument, I was impressed that since the present proceeding contemplated the rendering of a personal. judgment, the writ of
Injunction could not issue to prevent the claimants from suing in the
State court. However, upon closer study and examination of the
authorities, I am convinced that the very nature of the relief contemplated by the declaratory judgment statute requires that when the
court takes jurisdiction it should do so to the exclusion of other tribunads, as otherwise, should the plaintiff be held not liable, prosecution
of the suit for damages in the State court would involve much expense
by both sides to no avail." Standard Accident Insurance Company v.
Grimmett, U.S.D.Ct., W.D. La., 32 F. Supp. 81, C.C.H. Automobile Cases,
Vol. 2, page 1109 (1939). Temporary injunctions were found to have
been granted by the lower courts also in the cases of American Casualty
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Two years later, however, the same Circuit Court of Appeals
is found vacillating badly upon the question. Some readers may
point out that there is some distinction in the facts as two of
the injured parties had already started suit, whereas in the
earlier case, none of them had done so. Inasmuch as the court
in the later decision places both groups upon the same footing
and refuses to enjoin either, this distinction is not valid. Note
the court's reasoning: "But it does not follow that the action
for damages pending or prospective ought to be enjoined. The
declaratory proceeding does not cover the same issues, nor can
it afford the injured persons full relief. They are claiming
Mrs. Norris and her husband are personally liable. The policy
liability is limited to $20,000 and the two suits already filed
are for $50,000. The policy may be wholly insuffient to cover
all recoveries. Delay is always harmful to such suits. Insolvency
might overtake Mrs. Norris, or even the Insurance Corporation.
Death of a party may defeat such an action. Witnesses may
die or disappear or their memory grow faint. A question of
limitation may be raised. It would not be equitable, if there
is power, to delay these persons in the legal pursuit of their
rights in order to enable an insurance company not yet sued to
ascertain where it stands, under a contract it has made with
24
someone else. "
Since conflict is apparent even where the federal court first
takes jurisdiction, more trouble may be anticipated where the
state court actions have been filed prior to those in the federal
forum. Until recently, it appears that many district courts
have been granting such injunctions pendente lite upon application of the plaintiff, usually without their authority to do so
having been questioned. 25 More recently, however, attorneys
Company v. Windham, U.S.D.Ct., M.D. Ga., 26 Fed. Supp. 261 (1939),
Aff'd. (1939) C.C.A. 5, 107 F. (2d) 88; Maryland Casualty Company v.
Aguayo, U.S.D.Ct., So. D. Cal., 29 F. Supp. 986 (1939).
Central Surety & Insurance Company v. Norris et al., C.C.A. 5
(Fla.) 103 Fed. (2) 116 at 117 (1939). This reasoning is cogent and
impressive. Certainly a weighing of equities must take place in every
such case. However, when nearly every injured person intends to
assert an ultimate liability against the insurance company, it may be
duestioned as to whether or not the arguments of the court are more
academic than practical. In accord is the reasoning in Moulton v.
Owler, U.S.D.Ct., N.H. 5 Fed. Supp. 700 (1934).
21It appears that temporary injunctions were issued by federal district judges in the following cases, where the state court had prior
jurisdiction over the parties defendant. Maryland Casualty Company
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have begun to fight vigorously against the wholesale grant of
injunctions and some different results have obtained. The
federal courts still permit the declaratory judgment actions to
lie simultaneously with personal injury suits pending elsewhere, in order not to delay the determination of policy coverage, 2 6 but with fair uniformity have committed themselves to
the doctrine of non-interference with the state court actions.
In 1938, the situation arose where a physician was sued
for malpractice, the claim being made that he had performed
an operation upon the deceased in such a negligent manner that
peritonitis developed and death ensued. The physician turned
the case over to his insurer which disclaimed liability, setting
up that the operation was a criminal abortion, excluded from
coverage. The physician refused to execute a non-waiver agreement and a declaratory judgment suit was brought by the
insurer. At that time, suit was already pending in the state

court.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held,
of course, that the declaratory judgment suit would lie and
that it was not in derogation of the state court's jurisdiction.
Upon the injunction issue, however, the court laid down a clear
rule of law: "It is true that injunctions restraining the prosecution of a pending case against an insured have been granted in
some instances in connection with suits by an insurer seeking
v. Tighe, 24 Fed. Supp. 49 U.S.D.Ct., N.D. Cal. (1938); Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Alexander, Inc., U.S.D.Ct., N.D. Tex. 23
Fed. Supp. 807 (1938); Columbia Casualty Company v. Thomas,
U.S.D.Ct., N.D. Fla. 20 Fed. Supp. 251 (1937); Maryland Casualty Company v. Sammons (see comments in 99 Fed. (2) 323); Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. Cunningham, U.S.D.Ct., W.D. Mo. 25 Fed.
Supp. 801 (1938), where injunction was granted one day and modified
the same day. And in Aetna Casualty & Surety Compdny v. Quarles,
C.C.A. 4, 92 Fed. (2) 321 (1937), the court implies that such power is
possessed but to be used at the discretion of the court.
"See discussion in Wisconsin Law Review, July, 1939, page 507,
note 31. Also the following cases decided since that time: Maryland
Casualty Company v. United Corp., C.C.A. 1, 111 F. (2d) 443 (1940);
Pacific Indemnity Company v. McDonald, C.C.A. 9, 107- F. (2d) 446
(1939); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Manning, C.C.A. 9, 107 F. (2d)
362 (1939); Commercial Standard Insurance Company v. Foster,
U.S.D.Ct., Kansas, 31 F. Supp. 873 (1940); General Accident Fire and
Life Assurance Corp. v. Morgan, U.S.D.Ct., W.D. N.Y., 30 F. Supp. 753
(1939); compare, however, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Hugee, E.D.S.C., 32 F. Supp. 665 (1940); Maryland Casualty
Company v. Tindall, W.D. Mo., 30 F. Supp. 949 (1938); Ohio Casualty
Insurance Company v. Murphy, W.D. Ky., 28 F. Supp. 252 (1939).
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a declaratory judgment of non-coverage (citing cases) but in
our opinion this course should not be followed in the pending
case. We should be guided rather by the principles enunciated
in Kline v. Burke Construction Co. wherein the court considered
the Act of Congress, 28 U.S.C.A. Section 379, which provides that
the writ of injunction should not be granted by any court of the
United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state...
This decision rules the application for injunction in the pending
case. . . . Even without the prohibition of the federal statute,
a federal court possesses no power to interfere with a proceeding in a state tribunal when there is no interference with subject matter in the possession of the federal court and no impairment of its jurisdiction. It may be embarrassing for the insurer
here either to defend the action in the state court or to decline
to do so, but that is a difficulty inherent in the provisions of its
policy which requires it to defend the insured generally, but
relieves it of the obligation in the event that the insured has been
engaged in the commission of a crime. For like reasons, the
fear of the insurer, that it may be estopped from setting up the
defense of non-coverage if it defends the suit in the state court,
furnishes no reason to restrain the injured party in the exercise
of his undoubted right to press the suit against the alleged tort

feasor. "27
In view of the fact that two other Circuit Courts of Appeals
have affirmed this view, 28 it may be accepted as representing
27Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Yeatts, C.C.A. 4, Va., 99 Fed.
(2) 665 at 670 (1938). The court does not, however, rely solely upon
this ground. Going on, the court proceeds upon the theory that the
state and federal actions are substantially different and that neither
court should, therefore, interfere with the free jurisdiction of the other.
The court also relies to some extent upon the argument so cogently set
forth in the Norris case, that the injured person being a stranger to
the contract, ought not to be delayed in the enforcement of the cause
of action for personal injury against the insured.
2"In
so holding, however, we do not decide that the court should
grant an injunction restraining Ross White from further prosecuting
his suit in the court of Common Pleas pending the determination of the
present proceeding, as prayed for in the petition. On the contrary it
seems clear that the court would be without power to grant such an
injunction in view of the provisions of section 265 of the Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. section 379, 28 U.S.C.A. section 379." Maryland
Casualty Company v. Consumer's Finance Service et al. C.C.A. 3, (Pa.)
101 Fed. (2) 5,14 (1938).
"As to the suits already filed in the State court, the statute against
Central Surety &
enjoining such proceedings stands in the way."
Insurance Corp. v. Norris, C.C.A. 5, (Fla.) 103 Fed. (2) 116 (1939).

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS; DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

61

the law, unless, of course, it be modified at some future date by

the Supreme Court. It should not be thought, however, that
this result has been reached without dissent. In a District
Court case arising in California, the question arose as to the
interpretation of policy coverage. The insurer sought a determination of its liability by way of declaratory relief, its action
being instituted subsequent to the commencement of the personal
injury suit. In the original action, decided prior to the important decisions just discussed, the court held that it had
power to issue such an injunction,2 9 relying upon a number
of lower court decisions, in which this writer, upon careful
perusal, is unable to find any reference whatsoever to the
issuance of such injunctions. The appeal therefrom wah
dismissed upon technical grounds, the higher court in discussing the facts referring to the issuance of the injunction
but not commenting upon the propriety thereof. 30 Upon retrial
in the lower court, the injunction feature came into particular
discussion. By this date, the court surely must have had the
various decisions hereinbefore referred to before it, but, without referring to these conflicting decisions in any way, the court
held the issuance of injunctions pendente lite absolutely proper.3'

The oddity of the situation is that the opinion of the court
is eminently well-expressed. While it may be questioned whether
"This court has no power to continue the injunction restraining
the defendants from prosecuting their suits in the state court pending
the determination of the present action." Glen Falls Indemnity Company v. Brazen, U.S.D.Ct., M.D. Pa. 27 Fed. Supp. 582 (1939). And see
the Intimation of Maryland Casualty Company v. United Corporation,
C.C.A. 1, 111 F. (2d) 443 (1940) ; Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Manning,
C.C.A. 9, 107 F.(2d) 362 (1939); Maryland Casualty'Co. v. Tindall,
U.S.D. Ct., W.D. Mo., 30 F. Supp. 949 (1938).
See, however, Jamerson v. Alliance Insurance Company of Philadelphia, C.C.A. 7, 87 Fed. (2) 253 (not a declaratory judgment suit)
and Supreme Court cases cited therein.
29Maryland Casualty Company v. Tighe, U.S.D.Ct., N.D. (Cal.) 24
Fed. Supp. 49 (1938).
3 Tighe v. Maryland Casualty Company, C.C.A. 9, 99 Fed. (2) 727
(1938).
"Maryland Casualty Company v. Tighe, U.S.D.Ct., N.D. (Cal.) 29
Fed. Supp. 69 (1939), wherein the court declared: "Section 265 of the
Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. Section 379) places no limitation upon the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and if the complaint discloses a ease
for the exercise of equitable and injunctive powers an injunction may
Issue as it did in the present case. Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 44 S.Ct.
311, 68 L.Ed. 678; Soverign Camp, Woodmen of The World v. O'Neill,
266 U.S. 292, 298, 45 S.Ct. 49, 69 L.Ed. 293; Alliance Insurance Company of Philadelphia v. Jamerson, 12 Fed. Supp. 957; Jamerson v.
Alliance Insurance Company of Philadelphia (7 Cir.) 87 Fed. (2) 253."
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the injunctive power can be extended to such situations under
an acute reading of the statute, or under a proper consideration
of the independent sovereignity of the several forums, nevertheless the opinion is based upon actual authority from the highest
court in the land. It is because of the confusion rampant in
decisions of the Supreme Court that lower courts can render
directly contrary opinions and support each by precedent. Likewise, the Jamerson case, cited in the Tighe opinion, would seem
to throw the weight of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit directly behind the particular district judge who
liked injunctions.
In another District Court case, the insured failed to give
prompt notice of an accident in which one Everts was injured.
The insurer claimed the delay in giving notice breached the
policy and brought a declaratory judgment suit, praying that
the state court action be stayed pending the determination of
the policy question. The court discussed the problem of a
conflict in jurisdiction fully, stating: "Where there is a showing
that the rights of the insured against the insurer will be fully
determined in the state action, without the imminence of other
controversies, the national court will not stay the state court
suit nor retain a declaratory application. The suit in the state
court and this suit here are each in personam. The state court
suit was brought first. Suits of that nature may continue
in the two jurisdictions until final judgment is reached in one
of them. Where it is apparent that in the state court suit
the rights of the insurer, as well as the rights of the insured,
for that matter, will be fully determined, there is no reason
for staying the state court suit."
The court then goes on to determine the application of the
statute containing the statutory restriction. "'The national
statute, 28 T.S.C.A. Section 379, which protects the state court
from such inerference by the national court, is not set aside
by the Declaratory Judgment Act. That Act merely brought
into being another exception to the operation of the statute
which inhibits the staying of actions in the state court. But
if the state court action will be as full and complete as the
Declaratory Judgment remedy in the national court, there would
be no such exception as would justify the giving of the new
statutory remedy the right-of-way. The rule then would be
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the same as it has always been, namely, that the two suits would
proceed in the two jurisdictions until final judgment is reached
in one of them which then may be pleaded as res adjudicata in
the uncompleted action. This procedure saves a conflict of
courts and preserves that comity which has always been highly
desired (citing cases). It being apparent that the suit which
Everts has brought in the state court may result in a judgment
against Alexander, Incorporated, which may form the basis of a
suit by Alexander, Incorporated, against the complainant, and
even, for that matter, a suit by Everts against the complainant,
and it being further apparent that the present state court suit
does not determine the complainant's liability, either to respond
to a final judgment, or, to defend, as requested, by Alexander,
Incorporated, it seems to be appropriate that a stay order issue
preventing the parties to that suit from proceeding until this
court can act upon the application to determine and declare the
liability under the policy.''32
In this decision, District Judge Atwell hits upon the weakness of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, if, in truth,
the difficulty lies there rather than in the courts construing it.
He points out that if the subject matter of the state court suit
and the federal court suit were the same, there would not only
be no reason for an injunction to issue but no reason for entertaining the declaratory action. He then goes on to demonstrate
the purpose of the Act-as set forth in the early portion of this
article-and by showing that the proposed relief would seldom
be effective without injunctive measures, determines that the
Act set up another exception to the rule of non-interference with
state forums. In other words, a partial repeal of the early
statute must have been intended by the Congress, an additional
exception to the rule, in order to effectuate the intention of the
framers of the Act. Only, in this case, the exception was
intended by the legislature rather than the judiciary alone.
Unquestionably, Judge Atwell knew of the familiar rule
that repeal by implication, whether in toto or pro-tanto of an
earlier statute by a later one, is not favored in the law. The
court, however, looked beyond this doctrine and studied the
intention of the Declaratory Judgment Statute itself. It was
*2Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Alexander, Inc., U.S.D.
Ct. N.D. Tex., 23 Fed. Supp. 807 at 809 (1938).
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evident that so many cases would present themselves in which
the relief would be worthless if another exception be not
engrafted upon the already elastic prohibition that the court
decided that it should be done.
Mfore than the repeal pro tanto question, the problems
troubling the writer may be divided into two parts: 1. Balancing
of equities between the injured third person who is eager for
trial and the insurer which desires a preliminary determination;
2. the inherent, independent sovereignty of courts of the several
states and those of the United States, which would render an
injunction by either upon the processes of the other absolutely
void, regardless of statute.
The first question has been cogently, powerfully argued
in various decisions herein discussed. The writer yet feel- that
so valuable is the declaratory judgment remedy, and so effective
of operation, that it is more equitable to give its quick relief
in insurance cases rather than to force the party upon whom
ultimate liability will almost certainly rest to wait a year or
two years. until the personal injury suits have been tried and
judgments rendered therein, to incur the costs of defense, to
dissipate the funds of all policyholders in a situation where the
particular insured is not entitled to protection-and to force
all of this certain loss merely because of a slight inconvenience
in the average case to several injured persons. The decision
is not easy to make thereon and would often vary with the facts
of the particular case, resting in the sound discretion of the
court.
Upon the second point, the writer questions whether the
federal statute prohibiting injunctions is really anything more
than an expression of the realization that the courts of the
sovereign states are free and independent tribunals, not subject to the judicial processes of the federal courts. If they are
free of such control, then would not any modification of the
statute, by implication or otherwise, or any other act which
tends to impair the free exercise of power by the state courts
be an invasion of their sovereign power Y Such sovereignity
exists, not by statute, but by the organic law. Any impairment
of such sovereignity, whether by legislaure or by judges, is an
attempt to change or to alter the organic law If this be true,
then all of the judge-made exceptions -which we have examined
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in the scope of this article are judge-made amendments to that
organic law. However, since these exceptions have been created
over a period of many decades and have received the passive
acceptance of most state courts, it is probably not desirable to
rake up hot coals of old conflicts and fan them into flame by
raising this issue now. It is probably better to let it lie dormant
and to resolve new issues upon questions of public policy and
utility.
If, then, we resolve the matter purely upon desirability of
result, we must agree that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is a sound one. It permits parties to avoid the
gamble of acting upon their own interpretation of rights and
duties, privileges and liabilities-of choosing between incurring
a certain loss or facing the hazard of a much greater one. As
previously pointed out, in many cases, the insurer must face
both a definite loss and a hazard of greater loss if it be not
permitted to secure a determination of its rights or duties by
such an Act. The purpose of the framers of the Act was clearly
to avoid all this difficulty and risk. The Act was intended to
be liberally construed. In view of the past freedom in engrafting judge-made exceptions to the statutory prohibition against
injunctions, is it desirable, when a really worth-while cause is
presented, to stop short and say: "Thus far have we gone-no
further will we go"? When the courts have, over a long period
of time, occupied themselves with evading the statute against
the granting of injunctions, is it wholly desirable that with
sudden nicety they refuse to extend their judicial cloaks to cover
this one form of action which otherwise stands naked of practical
relief?
The federal decisions show clearly that injunctions will
be issued where the federal court first obtains jurisdiction
of the parties, despite the difference in subject matter. Pending
suits, as shown herein, they have usually refused to touch. With
so many exceptions already added to the judicial prohibition, the
writer questions the wisdom of such restraint in passing upon
declaratory judgment questions.

